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TORTS
Right of Brother and Sister to Sue
May an unemancipated minor child recover damages from her
unemancipated minor sister for negligence which proximately
caused her injury? This question was recently answered affirma-
tively by a Connecticut court. The court also allowed the father,
acting as personal representative of another minor sister, to
recover against the negligent minor under the wrongful death
statute.
While riding to church in the family automobile, one minor
sister of the defendant was killed and another was personally
injured in a collision proximately caused by the negligence of
their unemancipated minor sister who was driving. Actions for
the two sisters were consolidated because a cause of action under
the wrongful death statute in Connecticut is not one which
springs from the death, but is one which comes to the representa-
tive by survival. Therefore, the survival action rested on sub-
stantially the same legal basis as the personal injury action, and
they were considered together.2
Defendant contended that the allowance of such an action
would be against public policy in that (1) it would be an invita-
tion to fraud, where the vehicle was covered by liability insur-
1Overlock v. Ruedemann . ........ Conn ........ , 165 A. 2d 335 (1960). The issue
has been decided in the same way in every court since 1938. Rozell v.
Rozell, 281 N.Y. 106, 22 N.E. 2d 254, 123 A.L.R. 1015 (1939); Mun-
sert v. Farmers Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 229 Wis. 581, 281
N.W. 671, 119 A.L.R. 1390 (1938); Detwiler v. Detwiler, 162 Pa. Super.
383, 57 A. 2d 426, 428, 429 (1948); Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421,
289 P. 2d 218, 224, 225 (1955); Midkiff v. Midkiff, 201 Va. 829, 113
S.E. 2d 875 (1960); Harrell v. Haney ........ Tenn ......... , 341 S.W. 2d 574
(1960).
2It is of interest to note that the wrongful death statute in Virginia is modeled
after the Lord Campbell's Act and creates a new right of action in the
statutory beneficiary, Va. Code 8-633.1 (1950), therefore, the cause of
action of decedent's father, as representative, would be denied in Virginia
under the present rule in this state that prohibits suits between parent and
child. Brumfield v. Brumfield, 194 Va. 577, 582, 74 S.E. 2d 170, 174
(1953), Norfolk So. Ry. Co. v. Gretakis, 162 Va. 597, 600, 174 S.E.
841, 842 (1934).
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ance, and (2) it would disrupt family harmony. These questions
were reserved to the highest court of the state where it was held
that such an action was not barred. The court was unable to find
any rule of public policy which would be violated by allowing
such actions.
The first defense was that where insurance is available to the
defendant, there is such a great chance for family collusion that
the action should not lie. To this contention the court conclu-
sively answered that the courts and juries are often called upon to
uncover fraud and that there is no reason why they could not do
it just as well when practiced by the family as in other cases.
The fact that there may be greater opportunity for fraud and
collusion in a particular class of cases does not warrant courts in
closing the door to all cases of that class. True, there is a greater
chance for fraud and collusion when dealing within a family
circle since the parties know that some third party will ultimately
suffer the liability, however:
the mere possibility of fraud or collusion because of the
existence of liability insurance does not warrant immunity
from liability where liability would otherwise exist. The in-
terest of the child in freedom from personal injury caused by
tortious conduct of others is sufficient to outweigh any danger
of fraud or collusion 3
It seems inequitable that the claim should be denied just because
the parties are minor brothers and sisters.
Those who argue for affording an inmunity say if such an
action were allowed brothers and sisters would flock into court;
but an analysis of the number of cases brought where the action
is allowed readily shows that this is not the situation.
If immunity is afforded, parents take a risk in allowing minor
children to ride in the automobile with their minor brothers and
sisters, even where they think they have protected the family,
3Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421, 289 P. 2d 218, 224 (1948), 'It is more
important to protect an infant in his person than to avoid the possibility
of fraud and collusion by the denial of such protection. If actions were
barred because of the ,ossibility of fraud, many wrongs would be permitted
to go without redress.' Midiiff v. Midkiff, 201 Va. 829, 833, 113 S.E.
2d 875 (1960).
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through liability insurance, from great losses arising from the
operation of the family automobile. The purpose of having the
automobile insured is to protect the family from financial hard-
ships in case the automobile is involved in a collision. The courts
that have decided the issue seem to have realized what a dilemma
the parents owning an automobile would be faced with if an im-
munity were allowed between minor drivers in the family.
In answer to the second defense, that of disrupting family
harmony, the court said that even though family unity was as
important today as ever, the courts must face the modern concept
of living. The property rights of children are enforceable at law
against other minors in the family.4 An action for negligence
would be no more disruptive of family unity than the actions for
property rights, especially where negligence actions, arising from
an automobile collision, are covered by insurance.
It is well settled that infancy is no defense for a tort com-
mitted by a minor.5 It is also well settled that an infant has the
same right as an adult to sue for tortious injuries.6 At common
law an infant was entitled to his own property rights and the
enforcement of his own choses in action, including those in tort,
and was liable in turn as an individual for his own torts.7 There-
fore, any immunity in such a case between minor sisters would
have to be an exception to these general rules.
The starting point of any negligence action should be that
for every injury there is a right to reparation. The limitations
which have been grafted onto this right have been deduced from
ideas of family life. There is a well established immunity excep-
tion between husband and wife based on the common law con-
ception of unity of legal identity. This has been changed in many
states by statute.8 Some have used this immunity as authority
4Preston v. Preston, 102 Conn. 96, 128 Atl. 292 (1925).
5Madden, PERSONS AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS 604 (1931) and
cases cited therein.
61d., at 601.
7Prosser, TORTS 675, § 101 (2d ed., 1955).
8The statutes are collected in Vernier, AMERICAN FAMILY LAW, III,
§§ 167, 179, 180 (1935).
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for parent and child and brother and sister immunity. The fallacy
in this argument lies in the failure to distinguish the relations
as they existed at common law. There was no conception of unity
of legal identity of parent and child and brother and sister.9
The immunity from suit by minor children, which parents
have enjoyed during the first part of the twentieth century, was
first recognized in 1891 in Mississippi. 10 What this case really
did was establish a new rule of exceptional character rather than
enforce a rule already established." The English common law
did not recognize a rule that a child could not maintain an ac-
tion against his parent for wrongs committed to him by the parent,
and all cases which disallow such an action are exceptions to the
common law. The nineteenth century English writers agreed
unanimously that a child could sue the father for an assault, and
the conclusion drawn from their works as to other personal actions
was that the right to redress by the child "seems to have been
treated as beyond debate."'12
"As to another English author, there is no possible doubt as
to the meaning. 'If the father is guilty of positive negligence,
if such a term is admissible - of doing something without
care or precaution through which the child suffers injury-
the child has prima facie an action against him.' "113
However, the majority of American courts, including Virginia,
still recognize this exception to the common law.14
9McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relations, 43 HARV. L. REV.
1030, 1056 (1930).
1OHewlett v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891).
"Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 150 At. 905 (1930).
121d., at 908. The case has a general discussion of tne rights of an infant to sue
for personal injuries at common law.
13Id., at 907.
14Annot., 71 A.L.R. 1055, 1072 (1931). There are cases stating that it was
recognized at common law that a minor child could not sue a parent for
tort. However, there is no authority for these statements and the Dunlap
case which says that there was no such common law rule cites several
English writers for support. The fact that there was no English case on
the point was due to the inhibition of children to sue parents, but does not
show that there was a rule against such action.
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Also, the second defense is in direct conflict with the first
defense. How can a single recovery both disrupt family felicity
and at the same time lead to family collusion?
Under the modem practices of insurance, the argument that
an action for negligence between minor brothers and sisters would
disrupt family harmony has no merit whatsoever. Where the
driver or the owner of the vehicle is insured against liabilities for
personal injuries, the defendant will suffer no financial burden in
being held liable. On the other hand, a brother or sister who has
suffered a personal injury and is refused the right to reparation
will suffer a great loss. In fact, if recovery is denied, there is
more of a chance to disrupt family unity than if recovery is
allowed.
The issue of the principal case was decided "in Virginia last
year for the first time.15 The Virginia court followed the trend
and refused an immunity between brothers and sisters in the
Midkiff case. The same contentions were answered in much the
same way as the Connecticut court answered them. The Virginia
court agreed that there was no basis for the assumption that a
recovery would disrupt family harmony and that the courts could
ferret out possible fraud. It concluded that there was no analogy
to the immunity for personal injury between parent and child
and husband and wife which are recognized in this state. Nothing
was found in the Constitution, statutes, or judicial decisions that
even implied that the recovery would be against the public policy
of the state. "The aim of the law is to deal with realities, and
where there is no reason for a rule one cannot be assumed to
exist."16
W.K.L.
lSMidkiff v. Midkiff, 201 Va. 829, 113 S.E. 2d 875 (1960).
161d., at 833.
